Kyle Fitzgibbons

​As you can see the employment ratio was about the same in 2007 as in 1990, and hence the aggregate data shows no evidence that either trade or automation reduced employment during the period studied by Autor, Card and Hanson, as well as Acemoglu and Restrepo.

Of course that doesn't mean these factors have not had a negative effect on overall employment, just that doing so would require a very sophisticated study. Unfortunately, the science of economics has not yet advanced to the point where that sort of study is feasible. And thus we are forced to admit that we simply don't know if there is any effect on overall employment.

​But I do think that we know that trade and automation raise real GDP.

Job destruction caused by technology is not a futuristic concern.  It is something we have been living with for two generations. 

First everything we hear and see regarding technology suggests the rate of job destruction will pick up.  Think of the elimination of drivers, and of those who work behind cash registers.  Second, the gains in average education and health of the workforce over the last 50 years are unlikely to be repeated.  Third, to the extent that non-work is contagious, it is likely to grow exponentially rather than at a linear rate.  Fourth, declining marriage ratesare likely to raise rates of labor force withdrawal given that non-work is much more common for unmarried than married men.

Will we be able to support these people and a growing retired share of the population?  What will this mean for the American family?  For prevailing ethics of self-reliance?  For alienation and support for toxic populism? These are vital questions.  Even more vital is the question of what is to be done. These questions should preoccupy social science researchers.  They are vital to our future.​

Our research concludes that 20-30% of the working age population have spent time as independent workers. Extrapolating this to the US and 15 core EU countries, that’s as many as 162 million people, with up to 94 million in the 15 core EU countries alone. Government statistics show roughly half that headcount, putting the independent workforce at a mere 11% of the working age population in the US and 14% in the EU-15. The difference primarily comes from the fact that more than half of this non-traditional workforce is engaged in independent work part of the time, and also that, in recent years, the gig economy has indeed grown, but still represents only 15%, or about 24 million, of the independent workers in our study. About 9 million out of that 24 are exclusively using digital platforms for their independent work – a little less than 40% – while more than 60% are combining both digital and non-digital means to perform their work.
​
The vast majority of independent workers, about 70%, whether primary or secondary job holders, say they engage in independent work by choice, preferring greater autonomy and flexibility than traditional jobs typically offer. And the majority of this group are indeed casual earners, using independent work to supplement other sources of income. Casual earners typically include students, retirees, or caregivers who combine work with other responsibilities and activities as well as some in traditional jobs, supplementing their income. And this segmentation is relatively stable between continents, e.g. contrasting US and Europe (Figure 1).

​Unfortunately, that still leaves 30% of independent workers who have no choice but to work independently. While they are a minority they tend to be more typically associated with the independent workforce. This group can be split into two categories – those who derive their primary income from independent work but would prefer a traditional job, and the financially strapped who would prefer not to work on the side but are forced to in order to make ends meet.
​
While we found most characteristics of independent workers were shared across our group of 15 European countries, there were some variations. At one end of the scale were Sweden and the UK, with 74% choosing independent work versus 26% working independently out of necessity. At the other end we found Spain with 58% working by choice and 42% out of necessity. The highest shares of independent workers were found in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, where incomes are lower and economic growth persistently weak. In these countries, some 15 to 20% of the workforce is self-employed or in temporary employment. In some European countries, including Greece, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Portugal, more than three-quarters of temp workers are involuntary.

Key findings include:
​

• In 2013, the working class—made up of those with less than a bachelor’s degree—constituted nearly two-thirds (66.1 percent) of the civilian labor force4 between ages 18 and 64.


• Based on long-term labor force projections from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and continuation of trends in college completion among different demographic groups, the working class is projected to become majority people of color in 2032. This is 11 years sooner than the Census Bureau projection for the entire population and seven years sooner than the transition for all working-age adults (18 to 64 years old).


• The prime-age working-class cohort, which includes working people between the ages of 25 and 54, is projected to be majority people of color in 2029.


• The age cohort projected to make the earliest transition to majority-minority is the one that includes workers age 25 to 34. These are today’s 18- to 27-year-olds and for them, the projected transition year is 2021.


• Wage stagnation is a universal problem for the working class, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender. This is an area of immense common ground, because in order to deal with class inequality (a cause of wage stagnation), we have to deal with racial disparities. At the same time, reducing racial inequality means also addressing class inequality.
  
• As the United States continues to undergo this demographic shift, we have to think in terms of big structural and policy changes that help to advance greater equality, expand opportunity for all, and yield universal benefits to the economy. This includes empowering workers to secure gainful employment, bargain for higher wages, and achieve racial and gender pay equity; closing gaps in student achievement and access to college; protecting voting rights; and enacting immigration and criminal justice reform.